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An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response
to Chief Justice Warren Burger's
"Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets"
Theory in Parham v. J.R.
MICHAEL

L.

PERLIN,

EsQ.

The legal system prides itself on rigorous issues analysis, logical thought
Processes and comprehensive use of factual data in cases involving the
social sciences. Since the famed "Brandeis brief' was filed with the United
States Supreme Court in Lochner v. New York 1 some 50 years ago, the
employment of social science data in public policy cases has been a benchmark of the appellate court process. In cases as disparate as Brown v. Board
of Education, 2 Baker v. Carr:3 and Regents of University of California v.
Bakke, 4 factual and scientific data has been molded by the US Supreme
Court to shape and buttress opinions involving virtually every controversial
facet of American life. Seemingly-unresolvable issues of race, religion and
politics have been decided through the use of such data.
To what extent, however, has this model been carried over to the field of
mental health law on the Supreme Court level? While State and lower
Federal courts have regularly used statistical data in mental disability litigation in such areas as predictivity of dangerousness, 5 right to treatment 6 and
the right to refuse treatment, 7 to what extent has this trend been followed by
the US Supreme Court? Perhaps not surprisingly, a review of the literature
fails to reveal a single article on this topic; after all, the Supreme Court has
decided more-mental health constitutional law cases in the past 15 months
(three) than it had in the prior 193 years (two). In spite of this (or, perhaps,
because of it) it is still an issue worthy of some consideration.
Specifically, how did the Supreme Court choose to deal with empirical
data in the cases of Parham v. J.R. 8 and Secretary of Public Welfare v.
Institutionalized Juveniles 9 (hereinafter sometimes jointly referred to as
Parham) on the question of the extent to which due process protections
~Pply to the "voluntary" commitment of juveniles to psychiatric institutions? Unlike Addington v. Texas 10 and Vitek v. Jones 11 -the court's other
two recent forays into mental health law-Parham and Institutionalized
Juveniles were class actions with extensive factual records developed below
after lengthy, adversarial trials; both had been argued and reargued before
:-----_
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the Supreme Court in an earlier term, and both had been watched carefully
by mental health professionals, other service providers, patients and ~ttor
neys. It could be expected that the court's treatment of empirical data m the
Parham pair of decisions would likely be a harbinger of its future ventures in
this area.
12
Parham, of course, reversed a three-judge district court decisio? ~hich
had declared Georgia's juvenile commitment statutes unconst1tut~onal,
holding that that state's procedures were both reasonable and consistent
with constitutional guarantees. 1211 It did, however, go on to rule that (a) the
risk of error inherent in parental decision-making on the question of institutionalizing a child was sufficiently great to mandate an independent
inquiry by a "neutral factfinder" to determine whether statutory admission
requirements were met/3 (b) although the hearing need not be formal nor
conducted by a judicial officer, the inquiry must "Carefully probe the
child's background using all available services, including, but not limited to,
parents, schools and other social agencies," 14 (c) that the decision-maker
has the authority to refuse to admit a child who does not meet the medical
standards for admission 1" and (d) the need for continued commitment must
be periodically reviewed by a similarly independent procedure. ts
As an aside, it should be noted that, while Parham is usually seen as a
defeat for the "patients' bar," 17 it contains much language which has been
subsequently cited to support pro-plaintiff decisions . Thus, its holding that
commitment constituted a deprivation of a protected "substantial liberty
interest" 18 and that the protectible interest extended to the question of
''being labeled erroneously ... because of an improper decision by the state
hospital superintendent'.' 19 was subsequently cited by Judge Brotman in
Rennie v. Klein 1120 as "strengthen[ing]" the due process of holding of
Rennie 121 (decided pre-Parham) that due process be provided prior to the
forced administration of drugs and by the Third Circuit in Halderman v ·
~ennhurst State School and HospitaF 2 for the proposition that '· Constitutional law developments incline in [the] direction of [ deinstitutionalization
as the favored approach to habilitation].''
.Its .hol~i.ng, then, should not give much succor to those who see it as a
maJor JU?1cial retrenchment. Even more significantly, its holding is limited
to ~ase~ mvolvingjuveniles: of the roughly 20 states which-via court rule,
legislation or State constitutional decision_ provide greater than Parhamlevel due process protections for juveniles in peril of commitment, 23 none
has abrogated or significantly altered its procedures in the 14 months since
the Parham decision was issued.
That Parham has had such a minimal effect appears, on the surface, at
least,. to ?e s~rprising. Generally, even when a Supreme Court decision is
not bmdmg, its moral weight is taken seriously by State legislatures and
State courts. The studied indifference to Parham - although not the central
focus .of this paper - is, in and of itself, worthy of notice and greater
attention.
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Perhaps, however, some of the "non-impact" of Parham can be explained away by the way in which the Court chose to treat the empirical
issue of what actually happens at a "contested" commitment hearing. For it
is here that Chief Justice Warren Burger sets out - for a five-member
majority of the court - his philosophy on the issue at hand, and it is here
where it could be expected that pertinent data would play a major role in
shaping the Court's ultimate decision.
First, the Chief Justice discussed the state's interest "in not imposing
unnecessary procedural obstacles that may discourage the mentally ill or
their families from seeking needed psychiatric assistance,' ' 24 an observation
which simultaneously assumes (1) the persons at risk are genuinely mentally
ill, (2) they are in need of psychiatric assistance and (3) such psychiatric
assistance is available at the institutions to which the juveniles are being
committed. Interestingly, although the lower court opinions in both
Parham 25 and Institutionalized Juveniles 26 discussed many individual cases
at length (some of which fit none of the Court's three assumptions on this
point), the Court makes no reference to any case history, supporting data or
scientific research on this point. 2 7
It continued in the same vein:
The parens patriae interest in helping parents care for the mental
health of their children cannot be fulfil led if the parents are unwilling
to take advantage of the opportunities because the admission process is too onerous, too embarrassing or too contentious. It is surely
not idle to speculate as to how many parents who believe they are
acting in good faith would forego State-provided hospital care if such
care is contingent on participation in an adversary proceeding designed to probe their motives and other private family matters in
seeking tbe voluntary admission. 28

•

Again, the Chief Justice does not explain how the admission process is
"Too onerous, too embarrassing or too contentious," and although he
''Speculate [ s J as to how many parents ... would forego State-provided
hospital care" if it were contingent on an adversarial trial, he nowhere
indicates the basis for his speculation.
Immediately thereafter, the opinion continues similarly:
The State also has a genuine interest in allocating priority to the
diagnosis and treatment of patients as soon as they are admitted to a
hospital rather than to time-consuming procedural minuets before the
admission. One factor that must be considered is the utilization of the
time of psychiatrists, psychologists and other behavioral specialists
in preparing for and participating in hearings rather than performing
the task for which their special training has fitted them. Behavioral
experts in courtrooms and hearings are of little help to patients. 29

•
An Invitation to the Dance

151

Although the Court cites a study provided by amicus curiae American
Psychiatric Association that the average hospital staff psychiatrist spends
only 47% of his time on direct patient care,a0 it offers neither data nor theory
to explain why such hearings would be "time-consuming proced~ral
minuets .'' In fact, the only footnote in the quoted paragraph is to an oft-cited
law review article by Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly which notes
"That, at some point, the benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard
is substantially outweighed by the cost of providing such protection, and
that the expense in protecting those likely to be found undeserving will
probably come out of the pockets of the deserving. ":31
The court continued by analyzing "What process is constitutionally
due , ":12 stressing that "The questions are essentially medical in character:
whether the child is mentally or emotionally ill and whether he can benefit
from the treatment provided by the State.' ':1a Although the Court acknowledged "The fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis, ":34 citing to the
Chief Justice's concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson,:i 5 it added,
again, without supporting reference:
[w]e do not accept the notion that the shortcomings of
specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision from a
trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical science to an
untrained judge or administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type
hearing.:is

•
In this vein, the opinion observed further:
Common human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that
the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine
the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and
treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory
than real. See Albers, Pasewark and Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testimony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of
Immaculate Perception, 6 Cap. U.L. Rev . 11, 15 (1976).:37

•
.

Significantly, the cited authority- and the other four articles discussed
the accompanying footnote 1737 A - all discuss the inadequate job counsel
usually performs at commitment hearings, and urge a more vigorous role for
counsel; none suggests that counsel should not be appointed or is unnecessary _:is
The opinion continues by stating its philosophical premise: that hearings
would intrude into the parent-child relationship. Without any supporting

tn
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citation, reference to the court record or analysis of behavioral research, it
sets out its rationale:
Another problem with requiring a formalized, factfinding hearing
lies in the danger it poses for significant intrusion into the parentchild relationship. Pitting the parents and child as adversaries often
will be at odds with the presumption that parents act in the best
interests of their child. It is one thing to require a neutral physician to
make a careful review of the parents' decision in order to make sure
it is proper from a medical standpoint; it is a wholly different matter
to employ an adversary contest to ascertain whether the parents'
motivation is consistent with the child's interests.
Moreover, it is appropriate to inquire into how such a hearing
would contribute to the long-range successful treatment of the patient. Surely, there is a risk that it would exacerbate whatever
tensions.already existed between the child and the parents. Since the
parents can and usually do play a significant role in the treatment
while the child is hospitalized and even more so after release , there is
a serious risk that an adversary confrontation will adversely affect
the ability of the parents to assist the child while in the hospital.
Moreover, it will make his subsequent return home more difficult .
These unfortunate results are especially ciitical with an emotionally
disturbed child; they seem likely to occur in the context of an
adversary hearing in which the parents testify. A confrontation over
such intimate family relationships would distress the normal adult
parents and the impact on a disturbed child almost certainly would
be significantly greater.=rn

•
The majority opm1on was sharply criticized by Mr. Justice William
Brennan , writing for himself, and Justices Thurgood Marshall and John
Stevens in a three-judge dissent. According to the dissent, the Chief Jus~ice' s opinion "Ignores reality [when itJ assumes [ s J blindly that parents act
in their children's best interests when making commitment decisions. " 40
Although the minority felt that a pre-admission adversarial hearing "Might
traumatize both parent and child and make the child's eventual return to his
family more difficu lt ," 4 1 it recommended the institution of post-admission
commitment hearings. It noted:
[T]he interest in avoiding family discord would be less significant at this stage, since the family autonomy already wiII have been
fractured by the institutionalization of the child . In any event, postadmission heaiings are unlikely to disrupt family relationships. 4 2

•
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Finally, the dissent concluded:
Children incarcerated in public mental institutions are constitutionally entitled to a fair opportunity to contest the legitimacy of
their confinement. They are entitled to some champion who can
speak on their behalf and who stands ready to oppose a wrongful
commitment. Georgia should not be permitted to deny that opportunity and that champion simply because the children's parents or
guardians wish them to be confined without a hearing. The risk of
erroneous commitment is simply too great unless there ts some form
of adversarial review, and fairness demands that children abandoned by their supposed protectors to the rigors of institutional
confinement be given the help of some separate voice. 4 a

•
In a sharply-worded critique of the Parham opinion, the counsel for
plaintiffs in Institutionalized Juveniles has written:
The decisions by the Supreme Court in Institutionalized Juveniles
and Parham ignore the facts, distort the law and condemn children to
second-class citizenship. The physical conditions, isolation and
dangers of day-to-day life in institutions are ignored. Inevitable bias
and conflict of interest of institutional professional staff are dangerously and incorrectly underplayed. Also overlooked and undiscussed is the critical necessity of a hearing and a children's advocate
to assure noninstitutional care whenever possible . Those children
most in need of protection, the youngest and most disabled, are
denied any protection at all. Children who are already under the
State's control and without the limited protection parents can provide are denied hearings as well. 44

•
It may be too early to speculate as to whether or not, in reality, children
actu~lly have been "condemn[ ed]" to "second-class citizenship," as

David Ferleger suggests. It is not speculative, however, to ponder how and
why the Supreme Court reached its decision without even discussing data
that was presented to it about what actually happens in such hearings, and
what the results of such hearings are .
First, as indicated above, the American Psychiatric Association had
filed an amicus curiae brief, arguing that due process hearings "May in
certain cases inflict psychological harm on children because of the unique
emotion-laden nature of the parent-child conflicts that will be aired in those
hearings . " 4 5 In support of this argument, amicus APA cited several articles
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as to why hospitalization may be traumatic to the parent, but none as to its
possible effect on the child. 46 The brief cited James Ellis' seminal article on
why counsel should be provided at such hearings, 47 arguing that the scenario
Ellis envisions - at which lawyers could'' Examine the parents as witnesses in order to explore their reasons for seeking the child's commitment, their
perceptions of the child's problems and their relationship to the family's
problems" 48 - "Could have significant negative consequences. " 49
Such hearings "Can severely strain the relationship between the parent
and the child, " 50 amicus APA alleged, because it is "Most distressing to
children [to hear J 'Negative remarks made about them by the parents. ' '' 51
Importantly, its citations in support of this argument refer to studies of
juvenile delinquency hearing, 52 juveniles in need of supervision" hearings 5a
and child abuse hearings 54 which show that ''judicial proceedings are
'damaging to an already-strained family situation.' " 55
Similar studies - not involving the specific fact situation before the
court - are cited for the proposition that "In certain instances, court
hearings create a considerable feeling of uneasiness, if not anger in the
child," 56 and that such hearings may "intimidate and confuse" younger
children, 07 even going so far as to possibly harm "the course of the child's
therapy " because the hearing could be viewed "As an attack on the competence and judgment of the child's therapist.' ' 58 For this proposition , the brief
cites one paper on "Children's Rights and the Juvenile Court" 59 for the
proposition that the adversarial role of lawyers is antithetical to good child
care because (I) the ' 'Disturbed child ... abandons the right to confidentiality,'' and (2) ·'A perceived attack on a therapist may negate the value of
therapy.' '60
Finally, the amicus APA brief suggests that the benefits of hearings are
"often overstated" because they are frequently "perfunctory, ritualistic,
impersonal, superficial and presumptive of mental illness, " 6 1 citing to two
studies (one of which was adopted by the court62 ) which critize the court for ,
in amicus' own words, "Most often accepting uncritically the psychiatric
recommendation .' ' 63
The meretriciousness of the proposition is obvious: while arguing
strongly elsewhere that commitment proceedings are not and should not be
considered criminal or quasi-criminal, 64 the APA urges the Supreme Court
to reject due process protections based on experiences in those supposedly
dissimilar proceedings; the authorities it relies on on the issue of the harmfulness of hearings presuppose the preexistence of a therapeutic relationship between a disturbed child and his/her treater, a dyad not commonly
found in many state hospitals (officials at the Georgia hospital that was at the
center of the Parham controversy, for instance, acknowledged that at least
46 children at that facil ity "Needed to be in a non-institutional setting and
Were being harmed by continued incarceration"). 65 The "Children's
Rights" paper cited in the brief-which appears to deal with juvenile delinquents - act~ally opposes ''The current generally unsatisfactory way of
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treating children in residential care. " 65 A a proposition supportive of plaintiffs' position, not defendants'.
Finally, the brief stands the line of authorities cited on the issue of th.e
perfunctoriness of commitment hearings on its head by suggesting that thelf
brevity and inadequacy is a reason to not have them; all of the authorities in
question urge an expanded role of counsel to make such hearings more
meaningful. 66
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court readily embraced the basic propositions proffered by amicus APA without much consideration of its supporting
data. On the other hand, it totally failed to acknowledge, consider, deal with
or rebut the data presented by another amicus, the Division of Mental
66
Health Advocacy of the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate. A
Since September, 1975, the Division of Mental Health Advocacy, a
statutory agency ,67 has provided independent legal representation to
juveniles facing involuntary civil commitment proceedings in six of New
Jersey's 21 counties, pursuant to court rule, 68 in a format comporting with
the full range of procedural due process protections .69 Its experiences and the experiences of its clients - have been totally opposite the scenario
sketched by the Supreme Court and suggested by amicus APA. Its statistics
and dispositions reveal that individual (often creative) determinations are
made by the assigned judges on individual basis. Dispositions are not limited
to a finite commit/release paradigm (as feared); parents have been generally
pleased with the counsel's involvement (in spite of the ostensible'' adversariness" of the proceedings); in fact, counsel has served to alleviate familial
tension and strengthen inter-familial bonds; representation has led to exceptional judicial creativity in an area not known for such developments.
Some background as to the Division's role in commitment cases is
necessary. Although conceived of by statute as "law offices,'' the regional
offices operate, in practical effect, as a partnership among all professionals
- attorneys, psychologists , social workers and others - on the staff. The
ultimate service provided may be "legal" in nature (i.e., serving as counsel
or, in the case of ajuvenile, as guardian ad litem as well, at a legal proceeding
such as a commitment hearing or a periodic review) , but input into the final
result comes from all staff members. The field representative interviews the
patient/client initially and gathers all data pertinent to the type of legal
representation called for. In the case of a commitment hearing, the field
representative will ascertain (I) The client's current medical/psychological
condition as evidenced both by the hospital records and by the field representative's assessment of the client at the time of the interview; (2) The
client's background- both social and medical- and current family situation; (3) The availability of alternative care facilities appropriate to the
client's needs; (4) The need for recruiting independent psychiatric testimony to present on behalf of the client at the hearing. For periodic
reviews, the field representative will obtain information pertinent to one
through four above, and, in addition, will review the patient's history of
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hospitalization to evaluate the nature of the care and treatment rendered in
an effort to determine if continued hospitalization is appropriate.
The field representative then confers and works closely with the attorney to develop the appropriate legal strategies in light of the individual
patient/client's needs and desires. The attorney appears at the hearing as the
patient/client's advocate, to advance that individual's desires to the
maximum extent feasible and to give the client a means of reaching outside
the system for an examination of situations in which his rights as an individual citizen may have been violated. 10
What, then, has been the result of those cases in which the Division of
Mental Health Advocacy has represented juveniles in accordance with
court rule? In partial preparation of its amicus brief, the Division reviewed
the 213 files of juvenile clients it has represented from September, 1975
(when the rule change mandating counsel was implemented) to August, 1977
(the time of the writing of the brief). Parenthetically, the vast majority of the
Division's c1ients were between 15-17 years old, although one child was as
young as seven.
In the 213juvenile cases closed by amicus' field offices, the dispositions
reveal a pattern of individualized court determinations. In addition, the
dispostions of the cases reveal that counsel- in New Jersey-fulfills those
multiple functions urged by respected commentators. 71
Thus, of the 213 closed files, 72 34 of the juveniles were discharged
following the involvement of amicus as counsel, but prior to a formal
hearing, 31 were released at such a hearing (in virtually all cases to their
parents' or guardian's custody), 14 were "discharged pending placement, " 73 six were "discharged pending placement" to a facility administered by New Jersey's Division of Mental Retardation, 74 15 were "discharged pending placement,'' to a residential school, 75 one was ''discharged
pending placement'' to a drug rehabilitation facility, 76 one was discharged to
the custody of Division of Mental Retardation officials, four were discharged subject to certain conditions, 77 two were transferred to out-of-state
hospitals, 78 three were ordered admitted to a special education program
While institutionalized, 79 five were remanded to local jails or youth detention facilities to await trial on criminal offenses or hearings on juvenile
delinquency petitions, or to a facility for "juveniles in need of supervision"
[1INS] 80 and one was discharged to a foster home. In addition, in two cases,
adjournments were entered (so as to facilitate residential school placement
and to avert the potentially stigmatic effect ofa commitment label), 8 1 and, in
38 cases, voluntary applications for admission were accepted.82 Finally, in
22 cases, commitment was ordered, and in 30 cases, confinement was
continued. 8:3
These statistics reflect, then, individual determinations on individual
bases. Dispositions are not Limited to a finite commit/release paradigm (a
fear often articulated by those who see the involuntary civil commitment
Process as taking on all of the trappings of the criminal trial). On the other
An Invitation to the Dance
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hand, they are specifically structured so that an individualized determination can be made-following the full participation of counsel at all relevant
stages of the proceedings - in the manner contemplated by many of the
8
commentators, including Dr. Alan Stone, who have pondered this issue . :iA
Significantly, in a lengthy and thoughtful analysis of this problem, Assistant US Attorney John P. Pannenton has noted:
Both the doctor and the minor's attorney should independently
determine whether the child is being coerced into seeking psychitric
help. Then a search should be conducted to ascertain whether possible alternatives to institutionalization exist in the community. Outpatient treatment, special education programs, foster homes and
family counseling services, to name only a few, may further the
child's interest far better than institutionalization. If the adult designated to represent the child finds that his client wishes to contest the
hospitalization, the role to be assumed by the adult is that of an
adversary. As such, the skills of an attorney are required to prepare
a proper defense and to obtain all relevant information which may
prove beneficial to the child. 84

•
Indeed , the roles played by amicus in the cases in question have gone far
beyond simple trial representation: in many of those cases in which amicus
was appointed guardian ad litem as well as counsel, 85 orders were entered
continuing the Division as guardian ad litem beyond the actual formal
commitment (or acceptance of the voluntary application)so as to facilitate
and insure the implementation of an aftercare plan. In other cases, amicus
86
has played an active role in such areas as facilitation of school placement,
and unblocking of available funds for special educational programs, assisting the family in obtaining an appropriate community education program for
the juvenile, 87 representing juveniles on individualized right to treatment88
or right to obtain Medicaid funds actions,8 9 facilitation ofan available family
therapy program, provision of independent psychiatric expertise to the
family so that the juvenile could readjust to his home setting after commitment , resolution of conflicts between social service agencies (e.g., Division
~f ~ outh ~nd Family Services [ DYFS]) and the juvenile's family, _and
fmdmg suitable aftercare or alternative care placements. These vanous
functions again, reflect a "counseling attitude" that far transcends the
narrow range of choices often feared as a necessary concomitant to the
presence of adversarial counsel. 9 0
In addition, while preparing its brief, the Division asked its trial office
attorneys to assess how the juvenile's parents felt about their children's
representation by independent counsel. Although admittedly subjective,
such responses mark the only instance in which such feelings have ever
been sought out.
158
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It appears that - in most cases - parents were affirmatively pleased
with the involvement of amicus. Although parents were hostile to the role of
adversary counsel in a handful of cases, in the vast majority, parents were
described by amicus counsel as "enthusiastic about our involvement,"
"thankful for involvement," "receptive," "cooperative," "positive ,"
"helpful," "pleased," "grateful," "very involved," "appreciative,"
"supportive" and " interested and informative."
Interestingly, in at least four cases, parents who began with "negative"
feelings or who were' 'uncooperative' ' with counsel, radically changed their
attitudes during the course of representation and became "positive" or
"cooperative" by the time of the final hearing. In these cases, it is most
clear that counsel did not exacerbate tension; rather, its presence actually
served to alleviate such feelings and strengthen interfamilial bonds .
Another phenomenon worth noting is that, in those cases in which
counsel either represented the juvenile on treatment questions or actively
sought an after-care or out-patient program, in virtually all instances, parents were especially positive about Division of Mental Health Advocacy
involvement. Thus, one casenote indicates, "Mother attended hearing;
appreciates 'pushing' by DMHA fDivision of Mental Health Advocacy J for
placement" (client placed in appropriate facility for juveniles with learning
disabilities); in another, where ajuvenile was discharged to the custody ofa
"JINS" program administrator, the note reads, "Father interested: pleased
with final disposition; participated in decision."
Thus, it has been suggested that, ''In a crisis situation, parents may go to
the first facility about which they are told or to whatever facility is
closest[,] ... see[ing] hospital care as the only approach to the crisis. " 91
The presence of outside counsel serves to help in sure that this parental
decision-often premised on incomplete or inaccurate information - is not
made and ratified in a factual vacuum, an especially pressing problem in
fami lies of lower socioeconomic status: "For poor families, dependent
upon public institutions, their problem is compounded by a more limited
number of resources from which to choose. " 92
Finally, the presence of counsel has Jed to exceptional judicial creativity
in an area in which, most likely, such creativity would be conspicuously
absent but for the presence of an adversarial role. In one case, a ''treatment
program'' mainly consisting of over 200 electroshock applications and 23
hours a day in seclusion - structured in response to the "behavior problems'' of a young girl with an organic brain condition - was struck down as
violative of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel. and unusual punishment;93 in another matter, the court held that a juvenile - on his own could voluntarily admit himself to an institution (thus avoiding the stigma
inherent in an involuntary commitment) if he ''Understood the nature of a
voluntary commitment and grasped the significance of the . .. proceedings; '94 in another, the court held that all documents and records pertaining
to the involuntary commitment proceedings be impounded ''To protect the
An Invitation to the Dance
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interests of the juvenile. "9 5 Also, where amicus represented a juveni~e
whose condition had been gravely deteriorating and on whom psychotropic
medication was having no positive effect, and where both the juvenile's
independent psychiatric expert witness and the hospital physical advocated
the use of electroshock, amicus petitioned the court to determine the need
for such treatment. 96 Following the hearing, the treatment was ordered and
97
administered, and the juvenile has been subsequently discharged.
In the case of a nine-year old autistic child, amicus successfully
petitioned the court to prohibit the use of aversive, electroprod therapy,
unless rigorous standards for staff training and program management were
met. 98 As the hospital did not comply with the court-ordered conditions, a
previously entered order mandating such "treatment" was subsequently
vacated. Elsewhere, the court ordered a local school board to reconvene
from recess so as to immediately appropriate funds (the release of which
would be otherwise blocked due to the recess) to provide specialized treatment for the juvenile in question. 99
Amicus concluded:
Cases such as these reflect the end results of the presence of
counsel: the presentation to the courts of individual cases in a
manner susceptible to individualized creative determinations.
Clearly, fears as to the involvement of counsel appear groundless. A
system which affords counsel and other procedural protections to
juveniles facing commitment is eminently workable. 100

•
In addition, amicus Division argued that procedural due process
safeguards would not be detrimental to juveniles; rather, it suggested, such
safeguards are beneficial to all parties involved in juvenile commitment
matters. At such hearings, independent counsel should have multiple roles,
including, inter alia, ascertaining the juvenile's true wishes, explaining
possible outcomes to the client (including, specifically, potential restrictivity of setting, alternative treatment modalities , facility regulations, etc .),
counseling the client on consequences of hospitalization, and "present[ ing] ... [the client's] wishes in as effective a manner as possible." 101
It cited Ellis' seminal article:
Finally, while the lawyer should try to avoid becoming a middle
person in future power struggles between the client and the hospital
(or parents) because of the detrimental impact that might have on the
client's acceptance of ordered treatment, it is appropriate for the
attorney to reassure the client that counsel will again be available at
the time of the periodic review of commitment, and may also be
available if problems arise concerning in-hospital civil liberties. The
knowledge that there is someone on the ''outside'' who is concerned
about his or her fate after hospitalization may be one of the most
valuable things a lawyer can give to a child-client. 102

•
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This position, of course, in no way conflicts with Alan Stone ' s on the
same issue:
Surely, some of the aforementioned functions are social serv ice
roles which far transcend what has traditionally been viewed as the
attorney's function , but if the attorney does not fill some of these
needs, it is unlikely that anyone else will; and without aid of counsel,
commitment can easily become a summary or self-fulfilling process.
There are, increasingly, lawyers who understand and are willing to
fill these needs , and if counsel come to be perceived as coworkers in
the mental health system, dedicated to the aforementioned array of
purposes, and not merely as righteously contentious obstructors,
their presence during the commitment process will be welcomed
rather than dreaded. 10 3

•
Amicus also dealt with the issue of the impact of active counsel on the
involuntary commitment process and found that it was clear that counsel
plays a critical, and in some cases, nearly dispositive role in involuntary
commitment proceedings - where active attorneys are employed, fewer
persons are committed, 104 and that "Intervention by counsel acting as
patient's attorney tremendously increases chances of discharge, not to
mention the other alternatives to hospitalization that may also be worked
out to the patient's satisfaction . " 105
In the same vein, amicus' review of the literature found that, if a child is
not afforded _due process, it is likely that the resulting institutionalization
will not resu lt in any '' lasting peace'' in the family. 106 It has been suggested,
thus, that judicial nonintervention supports the integrity of the family unit
only in the sense that it allows the parents in a dysfunctional family to deny
the existence of real family problems by '' Blaming them on the illness of one
of their children." 101 Such "artificial domestic tranquility" 108 should not
serve as a rationalization for the denial of procedural due process.
Not a single one of amicus' points, however, was dealt with in the
Supreme Court's ultimate opinion. Although a lead article-published after
the Parham briefs were filed, but before a decision was rendered ·analyzed what actually hl:lppens at commitment hearings , and concluded
that such inquiries "Contain considerable potential for therapeutic effects," 109 that article was not cited anywhere in the Supreme Court's
lengthy opinion in Parham. Nowhere are any of the arguments in question
addressed.
In summary, in spite of the Chief Justice's assertions, the credible-and
uncontroverted-evidence before the Court could lead only to the inescapable conclusion that counseled due process hearings for juveniles are
necessary, effective and ameliorative; the suggestion that they are merely

An Invitation to the Dance

161

' ' time-consuming procedural minuets'' distorts the fact , the law and reality .
The startling fact that no state has voluntarily abrogated its own pre-Parham
procedural due process safeguard s scheme in the last year-and-a-half
perha ps indicates th at no one will dance the minuet with the Chief Justice .
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